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NEPAL BACKGROUNDER: 
CEASEFIRE – SOFT LANDING OR STRATEGIC PAUSE? 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Driven by growing pressure on the battlefield, 
increasing international isolation and a sense that the 
time is ripe for political gains, the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist) has engaged in a ceasefire with 
government forces since 29 January 2003. A 22-
point “code of conduct” has been reached that will 
serve essentially as the military ground rules while 
peace negotiations proceed, although unfortunately 
each side has already accused the other of persistent 
violations and no strong, independent verification 
process is in place.  
The potential for successful negotiations is higher 
than during a similar ceasefire that collapsed in 
2001, but significant potential spoilers remain. 
Negotiations have been directly between the 
Maoists and representatives hand-picked by King 
Gyanendra. Mainstream political parties have not 
been given a seat at the table and continue to object 
that Prime Minister Lokendra Chand’s government 
is unconstitutional and illegitimate. The parties, the 
Maoists and the palace remain locked in a three-
way struggle for public support and strategic 
position, each hoping to use the other in its bid to 
control the state. The potential for miscalculation is 
considerable, and hardline elements in each camp 
appear willing to risk confrontation – even new 
violence – if they feel their needs are not being met. 
In many ways, the crisis represents a failure to 
cement broader reforms or sounder institutional 
arrangements after the democratic uprising of 1990. 
The constitution drafted then was flawed and left the 
monarchy with considerable, but ill-defined powers. 
Since 1990, parties have engaged in systematic 
corruption and continue to be dominated by elite, 
older, often non-responsive leaderships. Failure to 
reform the police or army or account for their earlier 
human rights abuses and corruption, also furthered a 
general climate of impunity, and a heavy-handed and 
often lawless response by the security services gave 
the Maoists recruiting momentum in the hill country. 
The Maoists, while often portraying themselves 
solely as defenders of the common people, engaged 
in targeted political violence, widespread extortion, 
bomb attacks and assassinations before the ceasefire. 
Issues such as the monarchy’s role, control of the 
army, demobilisation opportunities for Maoist 
fighters, restoration of democracy, formation of a 
possible constituent assembly and establishment of 
an interim government will be central to negotiations. 
While it will be tempting for the royalist government 
to restrict these to the palace and Maoists, that 
approach would place Nepal’s battered democracy in 
greater jeopardy, and perhaps even push the Maoists 
and the political parties together. Efforts by the 
palace simply to “go-slow” and hope the pressure to 
restore democracy will dissipate would likely prove 
counterproductive. 
India remains deeply concerned about the potential 
for either a failed or Maoist state on its northern 
border. A destabilised state directly between China 
and India would have serious international 
ramifications. These concerns, as well as increasing 
U.S. military assistance to Nepal, may have helped 
push New Delhi to take a harder line with the 
Maoists and urge a negotiated solution. While U.S. 
policy has been largely monotone – directing 
substantial military aid to the government and rather 
simplistically viewing the conflict largely as an 
extension of the global war on terrorism – this also 
likely contributed to Maoist willingness to talk.  
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However, the forces driving the conflict – including 
the failure to curb the abuses of political leaders, the 
monarchy and security services alike – are complex. 
A misreading will only make tackling Nepal’s 
fundamental needs more difficult while leaving the 
conditions for renewed conflict in place.  
This initial report lays out the background of the 
conflict and analyses the positions of the various 
actors, both domestic and international. Subsequent 
ICG reporting will address specific issues in greater 
detail and offer policy recommendations. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 10 April 2003 
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NEPAL BACKGROUNDER: 
CEASEFIRE – SOFT LANDING OR STRATEGIC PAUSE? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the euphoria surrounding the 29 January 
2003 announcement of a ceasefire between the 
government and the insurgent Communist Party 
(Maoist) has cooled somewhat, Nepal has a genuine 
opportunity for peace with the March 
announcement of an agreed code of conduct 
between the parties.1 This was the first step toward 
relaunching formal peace talks. Unfortunately, the 
situation remains fragile, and the monarchy, the 
increasingly marginalised political parties and the 
Maoists all continue to jockey for position and 
public favour in an environment where any 
miscalculation could quickly lead again to 
bloodshed. 
All the actors have issued earnest proclamations in 
favour of lasting peace, and certainly the thirst 
among average Nepalese for a permanent end to the 
civil war is considerable and genuine. Yet, as one 
senior international official indicated, the situation 
remains “more hopeful than optimistic”.2 Lingering 
pessimism about peace prospects is a direct by-
product of the broad failures of Nepal’s institutions 
during the modern era and the seemingly chronic 
unwillingness of the political parties, the monarchy 
or the Maoists to look beyond immediate vested 
interests. Indeed, many Nepalese appear to be 
thoroughly disgusted with their country’s leaders 
and profoundly discouraged about the likelihood for 
change in their daily lives – with or without peace. 
A fundamental crisis of governance fuelled the 
rapid rise of the Maoist insurgency over the last 
seven years, particularly failure to reform the 
 
 
1 For purposes of this briefing, the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) is referred to simply as “the Maoists”.  
2 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 13 March 2003. 
security services or establish rule of law and 
accountability as the bedrock of a democratic 
society. The inability of Nepal’s elites to foster 
broader economic and social development or avoid 
the temptations of corruption are almost universally 
cited as core public grievances. Ironically, Nepal’s 
elites also readily acknowledge many of these 
shortcomings, although they have been reluctant to 
change more than their rhetoric. The future of 
Nepal’s political system is deeply cloudy, a result 
both of the constitutional demands of the Maoists 
and the decision on 4 October 2002 by King 
Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev to suspend the 
elected parliament and install a caretaker prime 
minister of his choosing, Lokendra Bahadur Chand.  
While the guns are silent, Nepal has entered a 
period of intensified competition for control of the 
state. In many regards, the crisis now has a 
triangular dynamic among the Maoist guerrillas, the 
royal monarchy and the large political parties, 
primarily the Congress Party and the Unified 
Marxist Leninists (UML). They are mutually 
mistrustful and eager to manipulate each other. The 
potential that miscalculations will unravel the peace 
process is considerable. 
! The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), buoyed by 
an influx of modern arms, training and largely 
unequivocal Western support, could take a hard 
line to negotiations, preferring to seek a purely 
military solution rather than make concessions 
that would threaten its institutional 
prerogatives. 
! The Maoists could splinter under the strain of 
prolonged negotiations and growing difficulties 
in securing or extorting resources, or because 
of anger among their cadres over diplomatic 
compromises. 
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! The political parties, although their strength 
has diminished, could attempt to mobilise 
mass street protests or otherwise undermine 
negotiations driven because of fears that they 
will be shut out of a deal between the Maoists 
and the monarchy.  
! The palace could push the Maoists and the 
parties into an uneasy coalition if it refuses to 
yield much of its undemocratic control of the 
commanding heights of the political system; 
! The Maoists could again calculate that violence 
remains their best option and use talks largely 
as a “strategic pause”, as they did during the 
2001 ceasefire. 
! Continuing political stagnation could push 
others of the many disaffected and 
marginalised groups, including ethnic 
minorities, to calculate that insurrection is the 
best route to political representation. 
A return to violence would come at a high cost as 
the war experience has already proven. More than 
7,000 people have died, the majority after 
breakdown of the first three rounds of peace talks 
between the Maoists and the government in 
November 2001 and the subsequent deployment of 
the RNA.3 Upwards of 70 per cent of the more 
recent deaths have been direct results of often-
indiscriminate RNA counter-insurgency 
operations. Human rights abuses by government 
and Maoist forces are well documented, and Nepal 
had the world’s leading number of enforced or 
involuntary disappearances in 2002.4  
Government control in rural Nepal is tenuous. As 
one Western diplomat told ICG, “The government 
has ceased to exist in most of the countryside”, and 
more than 1,000 Village Development Committee 
offices have been damaged or destroyed by 
Maoists.5 Before the ceasefire, more than two-thirds 
 
 
3 The figure of more than 7,000 dead is an estimate by the 
government that is broadly accepted by human rights groups 
and other observers. Accurate casualties figures are hard to 
ascertain as both sides exaggerate. The Informal Sector 
Service Centre of Nepal estimates slightly more than 7,400 
dead between 13 February 1996 and 16 February 2003. See 
www.insec.org.np for a breakdown by district. 
4 Nepal led the list with 28 such cases and Colombia was 
second with fourteen. See the United Nations Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/chr59/70AV.pdf.  
5 ICG Interview, Kathmandu, 10 January 2003. 
of Nepal was outside the control of security forces. 
Indian embassy officials indicate that roughly 
120,000 displaced Nepalese crossed into India 
during January 2003 alone – fleeing both forced 
recruitment by the Maoists and RNA attacks. 
Although some returns have begun with the 
ceasefire, depopulation of parts of western Nepal 
remains a concern. Lack of institutions in the 
countryside is a stern challenge to long-term 
development.  
The dismal economy further complicates the 
situation. Annual per capita income is a paltry 
U.S.$220, and Nepal is 142nd on the UNDP’s 
Human Development Index – only Laos, 
Bangladesh and Afghanistan are worse off in Asia.6 
Revenues from tourism and carpet exports are 
sharply down, and with much of the country beyond 
government control, an already low tax base has 
been further diminished. The government relies on 
foreign assistance for roughly 40 per cent of its 
budget, and such financing could well be jeopardised 
by international concerns related to corruption, 
human rights abuses or the suspension of 
democracy. 
While the conflict has largely not been drawn along 
ethnic lines, Maoist appeals to ethnic liberation 
movements and promises to right widespread 
injustices driven by caste, geography and minority 
status have touched a sensitive vein. Many Nepalese 
rightly feel that government has served them poorly, 
and systemic inequalities continue to hamper the 
country’s potential. It is important to note, however, 
that all parties to the peace talks are primarily drawn 
from Nepal’s elite; their commitment to widen 
political space remains in question.7  
 
 
6The UNDP’s Human Development Index measures 
achievements in terms of life expectancy, education and 
adjusted real income. See www.undp.org. 
7 Rajendra Pradahan describes Nepal’s 60 caste and ethnic 
groups along the following broad lines in his article 
“Ethnicity, caste and a pluralist society”, that appeared in 
Kanak Dixit and Shastri Ramachandaran, eds., State of 
Nepal (Kathmandu, 2002): “In terms of caste and ethnic 
break-down the country is essentially a conglomeration of 
minorities, with the two largest groups comprising but 16 
per cent (Chetri) and nearly 13 per cent (Bahun) of the 
population. None of the other groups constitute more than 
10 per cent of the population. In terms of groupings, the 
1991 census recorded 40.3 per cent of the population as hill-
based Parbatiyas (Chetri 16.1 per cent, Bahun-12.9 per cent, 
and three ‘untouchable’ and other service castes, dalits, 11.3 
per cent). The janjati ethnic groups, of both hill and plains 
Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic Pause? 
ICG Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003 Page 3 
 
 
 
Nepal is at an important crossroads both politically 
and militarily. While all sides have expressed 
rhetorical willingness to engage in substantive peace 
talks and resolve the political impasse, violence 
could again surge quickly if the situation erodes. 
Given the fragile state of Nepal’s institutions and 
economy, such warfare could be transformed from a 
short-term upheaval into a chronic and deeply costly 
crisis. Genuine compromise, consistent international 
pressure to make politics more inclusive, and efforts 
to forge a constitutional framework that promotes 
rule of law and sound institution building may be 
the only way forward.  
 
 
taken together, constitute 35.5 per cent of the population, 
whereas the hill ethnic groups alone make up 26.5 per cent 
of all Nepalis. The major hill ethnic groups are the Magar, 
Newar, Tamang, Rai, Gurung and Limbu. The Tharu (6.5 
per cent) constitute the largest ethnic group of the plains”. 
II. CONTEXT FOR CONFLICT 
Since 1990, Nepal has undergone remarkable 
turbulence, tragedy and unrealised expectations. 
Although it has always enjoyed an unrealistically 
idyllic image, the seeds of many of these troubles 
were effectively planted by long reluctance to 
embrace more open economic and political systems. 
The confrontation with the Maoists has painfully 
exposed Nepal’s slowness to modernise a society 
that is heavily dominated by issues of class, caste, 
ethnicity and geography. Economics and politics 
largely seem to be pursued as zero sum games, thus 
creating abiding cynicism within society and 
underscoring the importance of a legal and 
constitutional framework that will serve all citizens.  
A. THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: A CRISIS 
OF GOVERNANCE 
A brief consideration of political developments over 
the last twelve years illuminates the depth of the 
current crisis. In April 1990, democracy protests 
rocked Kathmandu as part of a “people’s 
movement”. Security services went so far as to open 
fire on demonstrators before King Birendra agreed 
to establish a constitutional monarchy, dissolve the 
panchayat, or partyless system of government rule, 
and dismiss the cabinet. Yet, once the immediate 
threat of street protests was removed, the monarchy 
worked assiduously during the constitutional 
drafting process to preserve substantial amounts of 
its power, and the leaders of the democracy 
movement seemed caught off guard by their own 
rapid success and unsure of how best to codify 
democratic practice. 
Some of the constitutional agreements reached by 
November 1990 and forged essentially as a 
gentlemen’s agreement between King Birendra, the 
Congress Party and the Communists, were 
troublingly vague, leaving poorly defined matters 
such as control of the armed forces and the king’s 
powers to intervene in a crisis. A local analyst 
observed that the king was moving to ensure “not a 
constitutional monarchy under a multi-party 
democracy, but a parliamentary democracy under a 
constitutional monarchy”.8 There was little 
credible effort to transform the security services or 
 
 
8 Drishti, 17 October 1990. 
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to ensure accountability for human rights 
violations – either when troops fired on protestors 
or the earlier excesses of the panchayat regime. 
The political parties appeared cowed by the king’s 
continuing control of the RNA.9  
Unfortunately, this encouraged a broad sense of 
impunity, not only within the military, police and 
monarchy that carried over from the old system, but 
also within the newly ascendant political parties, 
who appeared mostly willing to overlook corruption 
as long as they were its direct beneficiaries. For 
many Nepalese, it appeared less that the political 
parties had cast out the old system and more that 
they had instead only ensured their own piece of the 
pie. A local NGO official put this reality in the 
terms of average citizens, “During the panchayat 
system you had to bribe to get a driver’s licence; 
you still have to bribe to get a driver’s licence”.10 As 
experiences since 1990 make clear, Nepal continues 
to suffer from a political system that exists in a 
nether world between traditional monarchy and the 
demands of modern democracy. 
Parliamentary elections were held in May 1991, with 
the Nepali Congress Party capturing 109 seats, the 
Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) Party securing 69 
and the United People’s Front – a splinter group that 
would eventually evolve into the Maoist insurgency 
through complicated manoeuvres – taking nine. 
Expectations for the new democracy were high.11 
Sadly, these were largely disappointed as the 
political system was whipsawed by a long sequence 
of no-confidence votes, change in governments, 
Supreme Court disputes, and deeply personalised 
internal party battles and coalition-hopping that 
seemed borne purely out of expedience. Since 1990, 
Nepal has had thirteen governments – hardly a 
recipe for progress or building institutional 
confidence. The image of parties as tools of a high 
 
 
9 The RNA directly petitioned the constitutional drafting 
committee to have the king remain its commander in chief. 
One party insider complained to ICG of the constitution, 
“We call it a revolution, but it was the restoration of the 
monarchy”. ICG interview, Kathmandu, 3 March 2003. 
10 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 7 March 2003. 
11 As an example of the lofty platforms presented by the 
parties, Congress promised that within ten years it would 
provide clean drinking water to all villages in Nepal, slash 
infant mortality rates by 75 per cent, dedicate 70 per cent of 
resources to rural development and link all district 
headquarters via a national transportation system. See Jan 
Sharma, Democracy Without Roots (New Delhi, 1998). 
caste, corrupt and nepotistic Kathmandu elite has 
become endemic.  
Amid this revolving turnstile of coalitions, most 
often led by the Congress Party working in 
conjunction with either the smaller Rastriya 
Prajatantra Party (RPP) or the UML, Maoist 
elements appeared to be just one of Nepal’s many 
feuding far left factions. The Communists engaged 
in a Byzantine series of organisational and 
ideological disputes. However, efforts directed by 
the Congress Party leadership to suppress leftist 
political activity in the mountainous West, including 
through violent means such as the police-led 
Operation Romeo, only galvanised both the Maoists 
and a rising tide of localised resentment.12 An 
international official noted, “The police reverted to 
the way they had behaved during the panchayat era 
because they had no other framework of 
experience”, and even a senior Nepalese government 
official agreed that Operation Romeo was little more 
“than the use of police for looting”.13 These heavy-
handed police operations are widely seen in 
retrospect as a disaster that provided vital fuel for the 
insurgency movement. 
In 1995, Maoist leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal (who 
also operates under the name Prachanda or “the 
fierce one”) and Baburam Bhattari, the group’s 
chief ideologue, publicly embraced violence as the 
best means to achieve the Maoist doctrine of 
revolution through a “people’s war”, although they 
had likely decided on this approach as early as 
1992. On 4 February 1996, Baburam Bhattari 
presented the government with demands that 
included abrogating the 1950 Peace and Friendship 
Treaty with India, drafting a new constitution 
through a constituent assembly and rescinding the 
privileges of the royal family.14 On 13 February 
1996, Maoists launched initial attacks largely 
concentrated in their strongholds of the Rolpa and 
Rukum districts.  
By 1998, the government again launched police 
reprisals in the form of Operation Kilo Sierra II. 
This more widespread crackdown was also 
 
 
12 Operation Romeo was a 1995 police operation launched in 
the districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Dang to suppress leftist 
activists. Under the direction of local party ruling leaders, 
police conducted a broad sweep, often arresting individuals 
without warrants and subsequently subjecting them to torture.  
13 ICG interviews, Kathmandu, 12 and 13 March 2003. 
14 It is interesting to note that the first eight of the 40 demands 
all relate to different aspects of Nepalese-Indian relations. 
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conducted with blunt force – creating more, not less, 
sympathy for the Maoists in targeted areas. The 
Maoists also shrewdly couched their rhetoric in anti-
imperialist, anti-monarchy and anti-feudalism 
appeals well designed to attract lower caste and 
rural families that felt the Kathmandu elite had long 
neglected them. Their arguments assailing 
corruption and political deadlock resonated with 
many Nepalese, and their strong ideological stand 
was a stark contrast to the constant compromise of 
values that seemed rife within the parliamentary 
system.  
On 24 December 1999 Indian Airlines flight 814 
headed to New Delhi from Kathmandu was hijacked 
with 155 passengers on board. India was quick to 
blame Pakistan, and it also sharply condemned what 
it considered lax Nepalese security. Eventually the 
hostages were released after being held at the airport 
in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar for eight 
days. While not related to the Maoist uprising, the 
incident put a heavy dent in the Nepalese tourist 
industry (particularly intimidating the many Indian 
travellers), and added to a growing sense that Nepal 
was facing a fundamental security crisis.  
Soon Nepal faced another tragedy that complicated 
its already difficult lot. In June 2001, Crown Prince 
Dipendra massacred ten members of the royal 
family – including the king, queen and his brother – 
before taking his own life. The palace slaughter sent 
shockwaves throughout society, and clumsy official 
handling stirred up deep anger and confusion while 
spawning a web of conspiracy theories that thrive to 
this day.15 Given the central role of the monarchy in 
Nepal’s history, it is difficult to underestimate the 
impact of this terrible event on the social fabric of 
the country. King Birendra had gained public 
respect and admiration for agreeing to establish 
multi-party democracy, and he had largely 
demonstrated political restraint during the 1990s. 
The Maoists quickly sought to take advantage of the 
disarray, claiming that the killings were part of a 
broader Indian and American imperialist plot that 
had been aided by King Gyanendra, who assumed 
the throne after the death of his brother and 
nephews. Despite no apparent evidence of 
 
 
15 Palace officials initially reported that an accidental 
discharge of an automatic weapon had taken place. 
Contributing to the surreal atmosphere, the apparent killer, 
Crown Prince Dipendra, actually became king for a brief 
period while in a coma and near death. 
involvement, King Gyanendra was crowned under a 
tremendous cloud of public suspicion, anger and 
doubt. Baburam Bhattari, the Maoists’ chief 
ideologue, went so far as to argue that the Maoists 
and the late King Birendra had been of a single 
mind on a broad range of issues, a rather brazen leap 
given the group’s long history of anti-monarchist 
rhetoric. While not able to spark widespread action 
against the new king or the sitting government, the 
Maoist public relations effort was effective in 
sowing further doubts about the efficacy of Nepal’s 
institutions at a time when insurgent forces in the 
field continued largely to enjoy success.  
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba assumed office 
in July 2001 amid high hopes that engagement with 
the Maoists might produce a lasting peace. Initial 
signs were encouraging, and the government and the 
Maoists agreed to negotiations and a ceasefire. 
Between August and November 2001, they held 
three rounds of peace talks, by the third of which the 
Maoists indicated a willingness to drop their calls 
for abolishing the monarchy. By all accounts the 
negotiations were plagued by a general lack of 
professionalism, with participants largely unfamiliar 
with how to facilitate talks and often resorting to 
press leaks and rallies to curry public favour.16 
Thus, while shocking, it was perhaps unsurprising 
that the Maoists pulled out of the talks unilaterally 
in November 2001 and launched high profile, well 
coordinated attacks against military, police and 
government facilities across the country, including 
the army barracks at Dang. The Maoists also 
increasingly directed strikes on infrastructure 
including bridges, clinics, dams, electrical supplies 
and drinking water facilities, all of which they 
declared to be part of aid projects backed by 
international imperialists. This appeared to mark a 
fundamental shift in the group’s approach and 
suggested a drift away from its populist roots.  
Prime Minister Deuba was said to feel personally 
betrayed, and he quickly declared a state of 
emergency and ordered the RNA to take on the 
Maoists. The army had resisted earlier pleas by 
political leaders to take a role in the conflict, 
insisting that it could not until a state of emergency 
was declared. Many observers saw that as further 
proof that RNA loyalties lay more with the 
monarchy than the civilian leadership. Although the 
 
 
16 ICG interviews with individuals close to the talks, 
Kathmandu, January 2003. 
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military had long declared confidently that it could 
easily break the back of the insurgency, the task 
proved far more difficult than imagined, and 
casualties escalated far beyond anything yet seen. 
Neither the government nor the Maoists were able to 
get a clear upper hand.  
B. THE KING ENTERS THE FRAY 
In May 2002 and due largely to continued 
squabbling within his own Congress Party, Prime 
Minister Deuba asked King Gyanendra to dissolve 
the lower house of parliament and call elections, 
which were subsequently slated for 13 November 
2002. In another controversial step, Prime Minister 
Deuba dissolved local elected bodies and replaced 
them largely with appointed officials. While many 
local elected officials were under intense pressure 
from the Maoists, this move was widely criticised. 
When the Maoists declared they would mobilise a 
national strike to coincide with the parliamentary 
elections, Deuba requested the ballot be put off for a 
year due to security concerns. On 4 October 2002, 
King Gyanendra, assailing the “incompetence” of 
the political parties, dismissed Deuba’s government 
and essentially reassumed executive powers. He 
then appointed a former premier, Lokendra Chand, 
as prime minister.17 Chand has been widely viewed 
as a monarchy loyalist, as have been those members 
of his cabinet hand-picked by the king. 
While a senior government official insisted to ICG 
that the king’s steps were entirely within the law 
and that “this is all quite normal” under the 
emergency provisions of the constitution, it is clear 
that Nepal has moved into uncharted waters.18 The 
large political parties have refused to recognise the 
Chand government, and the palace has resisted 
setting any timetable for new elections. Prime 
Minister Chand and the palace have also rejected 
calls by the parties either to form an all-party 
government or restore the parliament. Public and 
international criticism of the king has been largely 
muted, driven by both concern about the growing 
Maoist problem and a mood verging on disgust with 
the behaviour of the parties. Indeed, it is striking 
that the fundamental support for democracy appears 
 
 
17 Chand, a member of the RPP party, was the last prime 
minister under the former panchayat system. He also later 
held that position in a 1997 RPP-UML coalition government.  
18 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 12 March 2003. 
to remain quite high in Nepal while parties 
themselves are seen as almost inimical to that ideal.  
Supporters of the king’s move to dump the elected 
government point to his emergency constitutional 
powers, particularly Article 127, and the importance 
of dealing with the Maoists and restoring normalcy 
to the functions of the state. Article 127 does give 
the crown discretionary, although ambiguous, 
power.19 Even if the king was within his rights to 
dismiss the prime minister, however, there is 
nothing to suggest that an indefinite suspension of 
the electoral process is acceptable. Unwillingness to 
set a firm election date or identify a timetable for a 
return to democracy would seem contrary to the 
spirit of the constitution. Opponents also note that 
the current government arrangements would seem 
to violate a host of other constitutional provisions.  
Once again, this demonstrates that the large 
loopholes in the 1990 constitution poorly position 
the country to conduct its affairs with regularity and 
predictability. The Nepalese Bar Association has 
openly decried the king’s action as unconstitutional, 
although the Supreme Court has remained silent. 
Even the political parties have been unwilling to 
challenge the decision judicially, reasoning that if a 
politically intimidated court rules for the king, it 
would set a dangerous precedent and leave the 
crown with almost unchecked power.  
Almost immediately after ousting Prime Minister 
Deuba, King Gyanendra began plans to start 
dialogue with the Maoists. He did so in a very 
discrete manner, and the genesis of the current 
ceasefire speaks volumes about the political climate. 
An emissary, Physical Planning Minister Colonel 
Narayan Singh Pun, was directed to reach out. 
These back channel talks were kept secret from the 
parties, and there have been credible suggestions 
that even India was left in the dark, a rather distinct 
departure from the past when New Delhi was kept 
closely informed about events that it viewed as 
central to its security concerns.  
 
 
19 Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution states, “Power to 
Remove Difficulties: If any difficulty arises in connection 
with the implementation of this Constitution, His Majesty 
may issue necessary orders to remove such difficulty and 
such orders shall be laid before parliament”. While this 
language is quite imprecise in its scope, it should be noted 
that the king’s orders have not been “laid before parliament” 
because he has failed to schedule elections to replace the 
parliament that he dissolved upon Prime Minister Deuba’s 
request. 
Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic Pause? 
ICG Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003 Page 7 
 
 
 
It came as a great surprise to the parties when the 
initial ceasefire was announced on 29 January 2003 
– a breakthrough that was even more dramatic given 
that it came just three days after the Maoists 
assassinated in Kathmandu the Chief of the Armed 
Police Force, Krishna Mohan Shrestha, in an attack 
that many feared signalled an escalation of the 
insurgency in the capital. The Maoists secured three 
important concessions in the ceasefire: bounties on 
senior rebels were dropped; Interpol “red corner” 
notices were rescinded; and the government stopped 
labelling the Maoists as terrorists.  
That a ceasefire was achieved between such 
unlikely partners has created a curious and often 
uneasy dynamic. The Maoists, who have long 
vowed to abolish the monarchy, have been dealing 
with the palace on a confidential basis. The king, 
who essentially suspended the democratic system in 
Nepal by fiat, has repeatedly appealed to the parties 
to support the peace process – although he has not 
made clear they would have a meaningful role in 
negotiations. The parties, which have long argued 
that promoting peace should be central to the 
government’s agenda, now appear to be actively 
considering undermining the talks because they are 
unwilling to see either the king or the Maoists 
strengthen their positions. A Western diplomat 
lamented, “the parties will sabotage things before 
they see someone else get credit”.20  
On 13 March 2003, negotiators announced 
agreement on a 22-point “code of conduct” to serve 
as ground rules during subsequent peace talks. It 
commits both sides, among other things, to stop 
violent and coercive activities; halt kidnappings and 
extortion; allow free movement; instruct 
government media to provide information 
impartially; and gradually release detainees.  
Both the Maoists and the RNA climbed down from 
some of their more absolutist demands. The Maoists 
abandoned their call to have the RNA return to 
barracks and thus leave them effectively in charge 
of much of the countryside. The RNA dropped its 
demand that the Maoists fully disarm and thus give 
up their negotiating leverage. Far harder hurdles are 
still ahead, however, if the contours of a deal 
 
 
20 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 26 February 2003. 
acceptable to the palace, the parties and the Maoists 
are to be shaped.21  
Both the security services and the Maoists complain 
regularly about code of conduct violations.22 
Security officials and many average citizens say that 
the Maoists continue to collect “donations”, while 
the Maoists point to ongoing arrests and harassment 
of their cadres. The general failure to agree to a 
tough and independent verification procedure has 
undercut mutual confidence.  
On 29 March 2003, Dr. Baburam Bhattari, head of 
the Maoist negotiating team, began making high 
profile public appearances in Kathmandu after years 
of operating underground. He was joined by other 
key figures in the movement, including the head of 
its military operations, Ram Bahadur Thapa. This 
signalled willingness by the Maoists to take an 
 
 
21 The Maoists and the government agreed to the following 
22 points during the ceasefire: 1. Both parties should be 
committed to finding a peaceful solution through dialogue. 2. 
Both sides should be committed to finding mutual agreement 
on matters of national importance. 3. Both parties will stop 
violent activities and security measures that might ignite fear 
amongst the general public. 4. Both parties will refrain from 
aggressive/provocative activities around sensitive/high 
security areas. 5. Both sides will gradually release prisoners. 
6. Both sides will work peacefully for the welfare of the 
general public. 7. The ideas/ideologies of both sides are to 
get fair and impartial treatment in the state media. 8. Both 
sides are to refrain from publishing inflammatory comments 
that could jeopardise the talks and peace process. 9. Both 
sides are to refrain from forcibly taking money or materiel as 
“donations”. 10. Both sides are to organise only peaceful 
meetings by way of protest; there will be no strikes, 
“bandhs” or transport strikes during the ceasefire. 11. Both 
sides are to refrain from searches, arrests and kidnappings. 
12. Both sides are to assist each other in maintaining the 
ceasefire. 13. Both sides are to allow the unimpeded 
transportation of food, medicine and essential goods. 14. 
Both sides are to allow the free movement of people. 15. 
While exercising their fundamental rights, neither side will 
obstruct the other from doing the same. 16. Both sides are to 
allow the unimpeded movement of negotiators. 17. Both 
sides will assist in return and reintegration of displaced 
persons to/in their places of origin. 18. A neutral monitoring 
team with an understanding of both parties will be formed. 
19. Changes to the code of conduct can be made with mutual 
assent. 20. Differences in the interpretation of the code will 
be settled amicably by both sides. 21. The code of conduct 
can be terminated through mutual assent. 22. This code of 
conduct will come into effect immediately and should be 
fully implemented within three weeks of the date of the 
signature.  
22 ICG interviews 29-31 March 2003, Kathmandu and 
Sindhuli. 
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increasingly public position on negotiations and has 
sparked considerable media interest in Nepal. 
In addition to holding a number of public events, the 
team has also met directly with the major political 
parties, Prime Minister Chand and key civil society 
figures. While insisting that the Maoists were 
serious about talks, Bhattari had strong words for 
both the parties and the king. He argued, “It is not 
because of us that the constitution remains as good 
as dead. It is because of the power struggle of the 
parties”.23 At an earlier event, he observed that 
while the Maoists want “the king to play a role, if he 
fails, he will be lost to oblivion”.24 
There are increasing concerns that while all the 
actors in the conflict are more sincere in their 
desire for peace than during the 2001 negotiations, 
miscalculations, whether by the RNA, the king, the 
parties or the Maoists, could quickly undo the 
limited progress to date and push the country back 
into an even more violent civil war.  
C. ECONOMIC PRESSURES 
Nepal’s economic development has remained 
painfully slow and uneven despite the fact that the 
country has made strides in improving access to 
health, education and clean drinking water over the 
last several decades. The failure to secure broader 
economic growth has exacerbated social tensions, 
particularly as traditionally disadvantaged citizens 
have become more aware of rising levels of 
prosperity elsewhere in Asia. The Maoist 
insurgency has hurt the economy in multiple ways, 
undercutting investment, development spending, 
local infrastructure, educational capacity and 
tourism revenue. A Nepalese aid official argued 
that economic concerns weighed heavily in the 
king’s desire to talk peace:  
It was not fatigue, but a broader sense that it 
can’t go on like this. It wasn’t the casualties 
so much, but the high cost of the war in 
terms of the economy and tourism. 25 
With increasing budget shares being dedicated to 
the military, Nepal is in danger of seeing its 
spending priorities tilt heavily toward the security 
 
 
23 The Himalayan Times, 1 April 2003. 
24 Kathmandu Post, 30 March 2003. 
25 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 7 March 2003. 
sector, an orientation that would come at the direct 
detriment of development. Yet, it is more robust and 
transparent investments in local development that 
are seen as the best means to sap the insurgency of 
its underlying logic. Nepal is one of the world’s 
most aid dependent countries, with foreign loans 
and grants financing 58 per cent of development 
expenditures in 2001.26 It should not be surprising 
that there is a vein of popular anger at “imperialism” 
in a country that has remained dependent on the 
outside world for so long while average citizens 
have very little to show for the relationship.  
If conflict is resumed, Nepal is in direct danger of 
being pushed into a downward economic spiral. The 
security situation has cut sharply into tourism in a 
country where those revenues have long been one of 
the few economic bright spots. Tourist arrivals were 
down 17 percent in 2001 and slumped further in 
2002.27 Tourism formerly brought in more than 
U.S.$160 million a year, and more than 200,000 
people were employed in the sector. Income from 
tourism has also declined for reasons beyond the 
Maoist insurgency, including the hijacking of the 
Indian Airlines flight, the royal massacre and the 
global slowdown in the industry after 11 September. 
The decline has started to have something of a 
ripple effect, putting increasing pressure on the 
banking sector as loans to hotels and other tourist 
facilities come due. The ceasefire has thus far 
brought only a modest increase in arrivals, and the 
latest round of fighting in the Persian Gulf will 
likely mean that further increases will not be 
dramatic. 
Similarly, textile and carpet exports have contracted 
at a time when new revenue is badly needed, a 
victim of both the violence in the countryside and 
lower global demand generally, although exports to 
North America have shown a promising rise in late 
2002 and early 2003.28 
Foreign investment has also remained wary of a 
country that is seen not only as increasingly 
insecure, but also as deeply bureaucratic and corrupt. 
The fact that the Maoists directly targeted Coca-
Cola, Lever, and Colgate Palmolive facilities for 
bomb attacks in 2001 and 2002 also had a chilling 
effect on the investment climate. For an economy 
that is both underdeveloped and largely non-
 
 
26 Asia Development Bank, Annual Report, Nepal, 2001. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Kathmandu Post, 27 February 2003. 
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diversified, with external investment largely 
confined to low-tech and low value consumer goods, 
these economic pressures make resolving the crisis 
of governance all the more difficult. 
Many of the economic difficulties are deeply 
structural and have made growth more difficult in a 
country that has few advantages outside of its 
scenery and hydro energy potential. While there has 
been some economic reform since 1990, often these 
efforts have stalled amid the frequent government 
shake-ups. A long history of corruption, often 
poorly designed and monitored international 
assistance programs and the general reluctance of 
the political leadership to embrace a broader 
definition of national interest have ensured that the 
majority of Nepalese continue to suffer grinding 
poverty. The sharp splits in development between 
the Kathmandu Valley and rural areas have created 
a sense among many that there are now “two 
Nepals”, and it is no coincidence that the Maoist 
insurgency sprang from those regions that have 
always been treated as the lesser of the two nations 
within a nation.  
Subsistence agriculture remains the predominant 
livelihood for most Nepalese. Despite a per capita 
income of U.S.$220, poverty alleviation has not 
been a central goal of the government since 
democracy was established – despite nods in that 
direction. Even more disturbing are the gross 
inequities that lie within the economic trends. In 
some of the more remote districts, the average 
annual income is only 17 per cent of that $220 
national figure. In the Maoist stronghold of Rolpa, 
per capita income is less than U.S.$100. In some 
parts of Nepal, the average life expectancy is only 
half that in Kathmandu. According to the UN, 38 per 
cent of the population is extremely poor and cannot 
meet basic needs.29 Other indicators are equally 
stark. Life expectancy is 59 years, and the adult 
literacy rate is roughly 57 per cent. Yet here, too, 
there is sharp divergence between the “two Nepals”. 
For example, in the mid-western mountains, adult 
literacy is only 33 per cent and life expectancy is 45 
years.30  
What economic growth Nepal has achieved has 
often been centred on those families that have 
 
 
29 UNDP “Nepal: Development Context”, www.un.org.np/ 
publications/mdg/index.html. 
30 UNDP Human Development Report 2002, www.undp.org. 
np/publications/nhdr2001/. 
already achieved middle or upper class status. One 
businessman in Kathmandu complained: 
Because of my religion and ethnicity I 
cannot do business with the government. 
There is an iron gate in the civil service, the 
military and business which only Brahmins 
and Chetri can get past. So if people can’t 
work with the government, what choice do 
they have? Only the Maoists.31  
Land use and ownership also are volatile issues 
that will have to be dealt with more effectively 
over the long term. Earlier efforts to set limits on 
the amount of land that could be owned by 
individuals were tepidly enforced, and many 
avoided the intent of the law simply by transferring 
large portions of their plots to friends and families. 
A senior government official was candid in 
acknowledging that the land system remains one of 
the country’s biggest problems, admitting, “I own 
a large piece of land in Eastern Nepal, but I’m not 
even sure where it is. Everybody in this 
government owns land”.32 The practice of large 
landowners thriving on the indentured servitude of 
landless farmers, although now illegal, has not 
been fully eliminated. While obviously land reform 
is contentious, and any land redistribution would 
have to come with compensation, the matter should 
not simply be placed on a back burner indefinitely. 
It would have to be undertaken with considerable 
financial support to be effective, however. Maoist 
attacks on land revenue offices were seen as yet 
one more example of their populist approach to the 
conflict.  
The economy’s health remains deeply dependent on 
relations with India. Nepal relies on remittances 
from India and Indian payments to Nepalese 
members of the Indian military, both active and 
retired. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of 
Nepalese live and work in India. Even more 
importantly, Nepal’s landlocked position makes it 
depend on its neighbour as both a source and transit 
point for the vast majority of its imports and 
exports. Over the last 20 years, India and Nepal 
have often wrangled over trade issues and customs 
duties, and New Delhi’s ability to use economic 
pressures to secure foreign policy and water 
concessions remains a sore point that has often fed 
anti-Indian sentiment. The renewal of the 1996 
 
 
31 ICG Interview, Kathmandu, 26 February 2003. 
32 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 7 March 2003. 
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India-Nepal trade treaty was welcome and helped 
ease doubts surrounding exports. However, for a 
number of reasons, Nepalese industries will feel 
continuing pressure to become more professional 
and competitive. 
War damage to infrastructure also strains an already 
stretched government budget. Although there was 
not massive destruction, even rebuilding 
infrastructure to pre-war levels will entail real costs. 
As noted earlier, over 1,000 Village Development 
Committee offices have been damaged, as have 
more than 400 post offices.33 In a number of areas, 
important facilities such as bridges, roads and 
schools suffered either direct damage or steady 
neglect. Another challenging proposition, if the 
ceasefire holds, will be the need to provide active 
livelihoods for numerous Maoist cadres in the field. 
 
 
33 Nepali Times, 15-21 November 2002.  
III. THE CONTENDERS FOR POWER 
Amid the uncertain calm of the peace process, the 
major actors are now in open competition for 
legitimacy and public support. All are eager to shape 
the contours of any peace deal to their own favour, 
and, rather ominously, all think they are negotiating 
from a position of strength. Talks continue directly 
between the royalist government and the Maoists 
with the mainstream political parties largely on the 
sidelines. While the government has made its disdain 
for the parties well known, and Minister Pun has 
declared that the “peace bus is leaving” with or 
without them, both the palace and the Maoists know 
that at some point they will have to deal with the 
politicians if a deal is to hold and the Maoists are to 
take a place in the political mainstream. This has 
triggered a curious courting process within the 
camps: the Maoists meeting regularly with the 
parties, whose leaders speak almost fondly of the 
same Maoists they had labelled terrorists; the palace 
and its appointed government suggesting that peace 
is all but assured.  
Underneath all the positioning, there remain real 
differences about the details of a peace deal and 
genuine fears in each camp that it will be outfoxed. 
All sides envision even a successful negotiation as 
taking years. More than ideology and even more 
than personality, all these groups have their eyes 
firmly fixed on political power. The ability to form 
effective coalitions and consensus on a triangular 
playing field will have a profound impact on the 
country’s future course and may well determine if 
the nation yet again descends into war.  
A. THE MAOISTS 
There are compelling reasons why the Maoists have 
been eager to come to the peace table now. The 
military situation appeared to be in something of a 
stalemate; the Maoists had not enjoyed a major 
battlefield victory in some time but continued to 
take steady casualties. The RNA was increasingly 
the beneficiary of a greatly strengthened arsenal 
procured on the international market and through 
international assistance since governments appeared 
to be largely willing to look past its battlefield 
abuses as part of the effort to slow the Maoists.  
Certainly the international focus on the war on 
terrorism was bringing the Maoists unwanted 
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attention, particularly the United States. Individual 
Maoist leaders most likely viewed the intelligence 
and security services of outside powers as 
potentially posing a threat to their personal well 
being. If the Maoists had been placed on the U.S. 
terrorism list, this might well have presented a 
permanent barrier to some of them being able to 
enter mainstream politics. As one local foreign 
policy expert concluded, “The war on terrorism had 
pushed the Maoists into an unwinnable position”.34  
It appears that mounting Indian pressure on the 
group was driven at least partially by concerns 
about the growing U.S. military influence in Nepal. 
India has long viewed Nepal as distinctly within its 
sphere of influence and an increasingly active U.S. 
presence could understandably be seen as eroding 
New Delhi’s strategic position. That Indian pressure 
may have been key in bringing about talks would be 
ironic given the group’s vocal anti-Indian rhetoric.  
The Maoists may also have been experiencing 
difficulties in maintaining control of their field 
organisation. Extortion, violence and attacks on 
infrastructure were beginning to cut into rural 
support, and keeping a large insurgency in the 
increasingly poor and depopulated hill country 
would prove difficult over time. In short, the 
battlefield seemed to offer the Maoists no clear 
opportunity to take and hold major cities in Nepal, 
while presenting a real risk that senior leaders 
would be apprehended or killed. 
Further, the continuing political disarray in the 
capital seemed to provide every opportunity to 
exploit deep divisions between the parties and the 
palace, a game at which the Maoists have proved 
themselves more than adept. Thus, from both a 
political and military perspective, the time appeared 
ripe for a major change in strategy. However, it is 
still an open question whether the group’s relatively 
recent interest in multi-party democracy is sincere. 
While almost all interviewed by ICG indicated that 
the Maoists are much more serious about talks than 
they were in 2001, it is also clear that they are 
willing to take up arms again if stonewalled by 
government negotiators. 
Given that the Maoists remain in control of large 
parts of the countryside and have proven themselves 
very capable of exploiting differences within and 
among the political parties, and between the parties 
 
 
34 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 26 February 2003. 
and government, they may have also reasoned that 
they could now gain more at the negotiating table 
than on the battlefield. The Maoists have also 
worked hard to gain the high ground of public 
opinion since the ceasefire was announced by 
appointing a very senior negotiating team, almost 
completely halting violence, issuing a decree against 
extortion, organising village level political meetings 
and using moderate language in favour of 
democracy, multi-party rights and the free market.  
Throughout the conflict the Maoists have adopted a 
fluid approach to their revolutionary model and 
military planning. They are willing to learn from 
mistakes and the setbacks suffered by other Maoist 
groups that have operated around the globe. This 
approach has made it more challenging to deal with 
the Maoists militarily, while often making their 
ultimate political goals frustratingly opaque.  
While much attention has been paid to the insurgents 
dense and voluminous writings on Maoist theory 
within the Nepalese context, it remains unclear how 
much of this philosophy is more than window 
dressing.35 While there is clearly a core of “true 
believers” in the ranks, the fluidity of the groups’ 
demands and tactical approach suggest a certain 
level of expediency. Given the rather abstract nature 
of many of their political ruminations, it is not 
entirely clear what level of political philosophy is 
actually being brought to bear in their activities. 
While the Maoists seem genuine in their concerns 
about tackling issues such as equity and corruption 
in the administration of development projects in their 
territories, there have not been wholesale re-
education campaigns and purges in areas under their 
control. That said, the Maoist doctrine is quite 
explicitly built around long-term strategies that view 
gaining control of the state as a fundamental goal to 
be achieved over years and by employing all 
methods possible. Given such a strategy, it is natural 
that there would be considerable variations in how 
the group’s ultimate agenda is interpreted.  
Much current policy debate is dominated by 
questions regarding Maoist intentions. Are they 
 
 
35 For example, the Maoists have spoken repeatedly of the 
need to end the relationship between capitalists, imperialists 
and the bureaucracy while stopping the “entry of imperialist 
capital”. Yet on 19 March 2003, Krishna Bahadur Mahar, a 
senior Maoist leader making the rounds in Kathmandu, 
insisted, “Our economic model is free economy with sound 
competition and level playing field for all players”. 
Kathmandu Post, 20 March 2003.  
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genuinely committed to a complete and 
overwhelming victory whatever the costs? Or are 
they willing to accept a negotiated settlement that 
simply gives them a piece of the pie? Observers 
wonder if peace talks are sincere or simply an 
extension of Mao’s old axiom of “jaw, jaw, fight, 
fight” that argued negotiations could be best used 
as a tactic through which to buy time for a more 
complete military victory. There are sharply 
divergent views on Maoist intentions, and these 
profoundly shape international policy responses. 
If the Maoists are seen as totally committed to a 
people’s revolution that will ultimately bring down 
both monarchy and the mainstream parties and 
establish strict Maoist doctrine across the land, then 
it is logical to rely more heavily on hardline methods 
to counter this threat. In contrast, if the Maoists are 
willing to engage in serious discussion with other 
political actors and ultimately accept a fair peace 
deal built around multi-party democracy and 
representative government, the policy imperative 
becomes quite different: facilitating efforts to get 
and keep all the parties at the table and designing a 
political solution that not only brings the Maoists in 
from the cold but also makes Nepal’s political 
system and economy more accessible to the many 
citizens who have traditionally been disenfranchised. 
Proponents of both sets of views can be found, and 
they marshal those facts that they can in support of 
their positions. Those arguing that the Maoists are 
implacably committed to total revolution point to 
their often extreme and highly doctrinaire rhetoric, 
their abandonment of the 2001 peace talks and their 
reliance on bombing, extortion and forced military 
service as examples of what would await the country 
if they came to power. It is also argued that the 
Maoists have always had the option of participating 
in the democratic process (although some earlier 
factions were indeed barred from the ballot), and that 
their decision to take up the gun was driven in part 
by their inability to win greater electoral support.  
It is further suggested that the Maoists will not be 
willing to accept any interim government that they 
would not control. Thus, the scenario goes, the 
Maoists would remain armed and would be well 
situated because of their control of large swathes of 
the countryside to secure victory at eventual polls 
through coercion and intimidation. Gaining control 
of the government and armed forces, the Maoists 
would then be in position to complete their political 
and ideological victory. Advocates of such a view 
raise scenarios as extreme as that of the Pol Pot 
regime in Cambodia in expressing their fears. Not 
surprisingly, government excesses and human rights 
abuses are seen as problematic, but by far the lesser 
of two evils, within such a worldview.  
The other camp, while acknowledging the often-
brutal tactics of the Maoists, views them as more 
willing to negotiate, less doctrinaire and more 
amenable to compromise. They note that the Maoists 
have behaved relatively well since the ceasefire and 
have shown flexibility in their demands, including 
dropping calls to abolish the monarchy during the 
last set of peace talks. There were some, but largely 
limited attacks, on senior political figures in 
Kathmandu. This relative restraint was seen by some 
as eagerness either to achieve eventual entry into the 
political mainstream or to avoid targeted strikes on 
their own senior leadership.  
Advocates of this position sharply question the Pol 
Pot analogy, and point out that Maoist management 
of the villages under their control has not resulted in 
the wholesale purges or massive re-education 
campaigns that provided early signs of trouble in 
Cambodia. They have not shown the level of 
ritualised brutality of either the Khmer Rouge or the 
Sendero Luminoso in Peru.36 While obviously the 
Maoists have attracted their share of purely criminal 
elements drawn to the cause for profit and by their 
skills with the gun, some elements have tried to 
engage in genuine hearts and minds activities and to 
manage local development programs equitably. 
Interestingly, few of the international aid or UN 
officials conducting assistance programs in Maoist 
controlled areas subscribe to the belief that the 
Maoists are solely bent on total ideological 
domination of the country or have found the 
insurgents unreasonable to deal with.37 A number of 
international aid workers and some journalists have 
been subjected to brief detentions by Maoists, but 
the group has largely resisted indiscriminate attacks 
on Westerners. In general, it has been far less hostile 
to multilateral programs than bilateral aid efforts. 
 
 
36 Comparisons between the Nepali Maoists, Peru’s Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Khmer Rouge are often 
made but usually reveal little. All three insurgencies made 
use of Maoism but were ultimately grounded in local ethnic 
and racial ideologies and political conditions. Although 
undeniably brutal, Nepal’s Maoists have not so far 
encouraged mass participation in killings, a key aspect of 
the violence of the other Maoist groups. 
37 ICG interviews January and February-March 2003. 
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1. The Maoists as an Organisation 
To many outside observers, the notion of a Maoist 
insurgency in the early 21st century seems almost 
impossibly anachronistic. With the general demise 
of communism globally, to have a conflict pitting 
monarchists, Maoists, and an array of other 
communist and socialist parties against one another 
appears to be a storyline from a bygone era. But as 
noted, conditions within Nepal are conducive to a 
rebellion from the hinterland, and if the Maoists 
had not seized upon the abiding public resentment, 
another movement likely would have. 
The Maoists have quite successfully appealed to 
what are widely viewed as deep injustices within 
Nepal, including abuses by the security services. 
Much of their attraction has stemmed not from the 
resonance of Maoist theory among poor and often 
illiterate villagers, but from the frequently 
inescapable logic of a general population that feels 
at best poorly served by their government and at 
worst preyed on by officials. Early Maoist attacks 
were effective in capturing the public’s imagination 
because they targeted some of the most obvious 
signs of inequality in the form of local upper caste 
politicians, police posts, the judiciary, rural banks 
and land revenue offices. One European official 
vividly shared what he saw as the attitude of many 
poor, rural Nepalese when viewing Maoist violence 
against local village political elites, who are 
overwhelmingly upper caste: “We’ve had no justice 
for 1,000 years and they’ve lopped his head off. Ha. 
Ha. Ha”.38  
The Maoists’ dedication to their cause has also 
inspired respect among some Nepalese. As one 
politically active Nepali told ICG, “I was beaten up 
during the democracy protests in 1990. I was not 
willing to die; the Maoists are. If they had been here, 
panchayat would have been gone 30 years earlier”.39 
The Maoists have enjoyed remarkable gains in the 
field for a relatively young insurgency. Common 
estimates before the ceasefire were that they 
controlled some 70 per cent of the countryside. Yet, 
any figure estimating “areas of control” in Nepal 
should be taken with a pinch of salt. While the 
Maoists could mount attacks throughout most of the 
country, they were not in a position to hold territory 
against resistance. In essence, they controlled large 
 
 
38 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 11 January 2003. 
39 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 7 March 2003. 
swathes of Nepal simply by default. The RNA could 
take most positions by day, and the Maoists could 
return at night. “Control” is a relative term in the 
many remote areas where there is little 
administration to assume. Government attacks 
increasingly put the Maoists back on their heels in 
some areas before the ceasefire, and there were 
reports that Maoist cadres had to dedicate increasing 
amounts of time and energy simply to avoiding 
government pursuit and comparatively less to their 
political and social agenda at the village level. 
Their general effectiveness in many aspects of a 
“hearts and minds” campaign, however, should not 
obscure the fact that the Maoists have frequently 
employed methods that are brutal and extra-legal, 
and some of their actions have directly hurt the same 
general population that they claim to place at the 
centre of their agenda.40 In contrast to the actions of 
the government forces, Maoist violence has usually 
been discriminate, although random incidents of 
thuggery, crime and score settling have taken place 
as the movement has grown larger. The Maoists 
have appeared to direct their violence toward a 
specific political agenda, whatever its merit. 
Teachers and local political leaders have often been 
the target of Maoist beatings, torture and executions. 
Teachers have frequently come under attack 
because the assignment of such posts in Nepal is 
unfortunately politicised. At times, these murders 
came in the form of high profile demonstration 
killings with the bodies left in public places as a 
way to spread fear and to intimidate. The Maoists’ 
unrelenting attacks on local political officials across 
Nepal has unfortunately disrupted democratic 
political development at the exact place where it is 
most needed and actually appeared to be gaining a 
measure of traction. More educated villagers were 
demanding results from local politicians and a 
measure of accountability that had long been 
missing from Nepalese politics. Unfortunately, that 
element has now been derailed and will remain so 
for some time even if the ceasefire holds. 
 
 
40 ICG interviews and Amnesty International, “Nepal: A 
Spiralling Human Rights Crisis”, London, April 2002 and 
“Nepal: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis”, London, 
December 2002. Amnesty has documented cases of killings 
of civilians, particularly teachers, government officials and 
political party workers by Maoists along with torture, 
hostage-taking, the use of cruel and degrading punishments 
handed down by ‘People’s Courts’ and the use of child 
soldiers. The Maoists also often summarily execute captured 
members of the police and military. 
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There have also been widespread and credible 
reports that as the Maoists came under increasing 
military pressure, they resorted to kidnapping youths 
and forcing them to serve within their ranks. Small 
home-made bomb attacks were also a favourite, and 
such attacks carried a high chance they would kill 
those other than the intended targets. In addition to 
efforts to liquidate local political leaders, the Maoists 
have also engaged in numerous attacks on high 
profile infrastructure and development targets, 
although they appear to have recognised that these 
strikes were rapidly dimming their stature. The 
Maoists proved effective at staging coordinated 
attacks to over-run police and military outposts, 
using superior numbers to kill most of those in such 
a post and capture their weapons.  
Yet, despite all these violent practices, the Maoists 
at times have appeared to be the lesser of two evils 
to some villagers, in that the violence they directed 
was generally predictable, whereas the actions of 
the RNA and police often seemed not only brutal 
but also capricious. 
The Maoists appear to be largely financed through 
a series of illegal operations. They consistently and 
effectively carried out bank robberies to augment 
their funding, and have also received both forced 
and voluntary contributions in the form of money, 
food and livestock from villagers.41 General 
extortion appears to be an important source of 
income, and even senior politicians in Kathmandu 
were reported to have been subjected to extortion 
schemes.42 Since the ceasefire the Maoists have 
insisted that none of their cadres will be allowed to 
engage in extortion.  
The Maoists also demonstrated an increasing 
reliance on bandhs, or general strikes, to show 
political strength. These general strikes appeared to 
work largely because individuals and businesses 
were quite fearful of Maoist reprisals and not 
because of widespread support, particularly in urban 
centres such as Kathmandu. Indeed, the bandhs 
prompted growing anger among many Nepalese 
given the already precarious state of the economy.43  
 
 
41 As of July 2001, Maoists were said to have robbed banks 
of more than 240 million rupees (more than U.S.$3 million), 
according to the Nepali Times. 
42 ICG interviews, Kathmandu, January 2003. 
43 ICG interviews, Kathmandu, January 2003. 
2. What Do They Want? 
The publicly stated Maoist demands are threefold 
and essentially sequential: the formation of an 
interim government in which they would take part; 
the hosting of a national roundtable conference that 
would bring together a broad range of interests 
including the Maoists, the parties, the monarchy and 
civil society groups to discuss the country’s future; 
and the establishment of a constituent assembly. 
Such a constituent assembly would be formed by 
holding an election in 205 constituencies, each of 
which would select a delegate who would assist in 
setting up a special committee to draft a new 
constitution. In theory this constituent assembly 
would then ratify the constitution either by a simple 
or two-thirds majority. How any such election would 
be conducted, particularly the security arrangements, 
would clearly be crucial to its outcome. 
Baburam Bhattari has insisted, “There is no 
constitution at present, it is a constitution-less state”. 
Nevertheless, there are suggestions that the Maoists 
would be willing to accept a pre-negotiated package 
of constitutional amendments that would then be put 
to the public in a referendum.44 Key concerns for the 
Maoists – whatever the form of constitutional 
tinkering – include greater civilian control of the 
RNA, curtailing the privileges and power of the 
royal family, jobs for their demobilised cadres, and a 
significant stake in any interim government. While 
their demands have almost continually evolved, the 
current set are perhaps most notable for their general 
lack of extreme ideological content. The Maoists 
have stressed that their aim is the “completion of the 
bourgeois revolution”, a phrase that is taken to mean 
creation of a capitalist economic system with multi-
party democracy. They indicate this is a vital step 
toward a more purely communist system at some 
stage in the distant future, but that explanation could 
also be an effort to prepare their cadres to accept 
compromises. Interestingly, the Maoists have even 
said they embrace open markets and want to enjoy a 
good relationship with the private sector. 
There are, however, widely divergent opinions 
regarding the bottom line of the Maoists. A number 
of commentators suggested to ICG that the Maoists 
have realised they are essentially at a military dead-
end, and it is only a matter of developing a “face 
saving” arrangement that allows them, in effect, to 
surrender. Others argue from the other direction that 
 
 
44 Kathmandu Post, 1 April 2003. 
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“a constituent assembly is now a given fact”.45 
Much of this confusion likely stems from a common 
source: the Maoists have been telling quite different 
things to different audiences as they make the 
rounds of Kathmandu – just as all the other actors 
are trying to use them to their own advantage.  
For example, a Congress Party insider noted, “The 
Maoists are not saying publicly that they want to get 
rid of the king. In private, they have been clear that 
getting rid of the king is a goal. They want a 
constituent assembly without pre-conditions so they 
can form a republic”.46 A senior government official 
takes a diametrically opposed view: “The Maoists 
agreed to a constitutional monarchy”, adding that 
the government would never accept a constituent 
assembly. “This is just absurd, a lot of noise, you try 
to pin anyone down on the idea of a constituent 
assembly, and they can’t give you an answer”.47 A 
Nepalese foreign policy analyst suggests that such 
posturing is quite normal, “The elephant has two 
sets of teeth; one for show and one for eating. The 
goal of the Maoists is simply to come to power”.48 
The fact that the Maoists have been dealing 
directly with the monarchy that it has so long 
denigrated has forced some rhetorical gymnastics. 
After the political parties complained that the 
Maoists were legitimising the current government 
through negotiations, the Maoists began to assert 
that they were negotiating with the “state” and not 
the “government”. They insisted that two armed 
equals were talking and that the discussions were 
taking place between the “old regime” (the royalist 
government) and the “new regime” (the Maoists). 
Such semantics underscore the complexity of a soft 
landing for the Maoists. If they truly wish to 
emerge as a force within a multi-party democracy, 
they know that any agreement reached solely with 
the palace will likely both lack broader legitimacy 
and rob them of the ideological purity that has set 
them apart from other actors in Nepal.  
It comes as no surprise that the Maoists have been 
actively courting both the UML and Congress 
parties. If the palace remains reluctant to strike what 
the Maoists consider a reasonable deal, some 
broader joint action with the political parties might 
be more advantageous than renewed combat with 
 
 
45 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 27 February 2003. 
46 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 7 March 2003. 
47 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 12 March 2003. 
48 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 3 March 2003. 
the RNA. The Maoists also reason that the gains of 
1990 were limited because only the king had armed 
forces. Certainly, the Maoists must consider the 
monarchy a greater direct threat to their interests 
than the political parties and that they have the 
ability to overwhelm the latter in any meaningful 
coalition. 
The popularity of the Maoists in any free and fair 
electoral contest remains a key question. While their 
support was quite low before they took up arms, 
several factors could now bode well for their 
chances: public anger with the traditional parties and 
fear that a ballot box loss could push the Maoists 
back toward violence; proven organisational skills; 
the appeal of reformist rhetoric; charismatic 
leadership; lack of other party activity in large areas 
of the country; and possible public accolades for 
reaching a peace deal. However, many also feel that 
if they gave up their arms, the Maoists would not do 
well in a general election. 
Given that the activity of the Maoists is often 
viewed within doctrinal terms, there is much 
speculation as to whether the insurgents are poised 
to move from the second phase of a people’s war – 
strategic stalemate – to its third phase – strategic 
offensive and a final push to topple the government 
and gain control of the state. For all the talk of a 
soft landing, the Maoists continue to maintain that 
they should be given one-third to one-half the 
power (the balance being split between the parties 
and the palace) in any deal, and they continue to 
use the ceasefire to step-up the political organising 
activities that had been sharply curtailed as a result 
of intensive fighting after November 2001.  
By all accounts, the Maoists have maintained a 
remarkable level of field discipline and command 
and control. A peace process of any duration will 
put this to a stern test as cadres watch carefully for 
signs of undue compromise or see their sources of 
self-financing disappear. Communist groups in 
Nepal have a rich history of factionalism, and the 
possibility that the Maoists may split or morph into 
ethnic or regional offshoots over time is 
considerable.49 Given that most expect peace talks 
to be protracted, figuring out what to do with cadres 
during this period will be crucial.  
 
 
49 See Sharma, Democracy Without Roots, op. cit. and Dixit 
and Ramachandaran, State of Nepal, op. cit., for fuller 
descriptions of earlier communist factionalism in Nepal. 
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B. THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
The political parties are in a quandary over the 
peace process and are intensely concerned that 
they will be left out in the cold. An official from an 
international NGO observed, “Before the ceasefire, 
there was a general sense that the king had 
overplayed his hand”.50 Now, both the Maoists and 
the government are receiving public acclaim for 
the ceasefire, leaving the parties looking for a way 
to get seats at the table. But in the blunt words of a 
Western diplomat, “The government couldn’t give 
a damn what the parties think. They are moving 
ahead with or without them”.  
While the temptation to keep the talks strictly 
between the Maoists and the monarchy is obvious – 
particularly given often fractious and unconstructive 
posing by party leaders – it is doubtful that a sound 
package of constitutional revisions for restoring 
democracy will be struck between the two camps 
without taking broader social forces into 
consideration. As a local human rights analyst 
maintained, “Donors may be impatient with the 
parties, but abandoning that process would be a 
fundamental mistake”.51  
The parties continue to resist lending any legitimacy 
to the government, reasoning that this would further 
their own marginalisation. When Prime Minister 
Chand called an all-party conference to discuss the 
ceasefire in February 2003, he was embarrassed that 
not only did the Congress and UML boycott, but 
even his own RPP was a no-show. This strategy 
may look obstructionist in the immediate term, but 
the parties believe that time is on their side. They 
reason that in today’s world, the king will not be 
able to suspend the democratic system indefinitely, 
and that without the spectre of rural violence, 
international pressure on him will steadily mount to 
embrace political liberalisation and hold elections or 
appoint an interim all-party government. Even a 
senior government official was left to lament 
privately to ICG on the state of democracy: “We 
have no parliament, we have no local bodies and we 
have no election. It is a sad state of affairs”.52 
The Congress Party, headed by Girija Prasad 
Koirala, has pushed for restoration of the previous 
parliament, although by all accounts this is a dead 
 
 
50 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 11 March 2003. 
51 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 14 March 2003. 
52 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 7 March 2003. 
letter. Given that it has already been dissolved, there 
is little constitutional justification for such a move. 
The Congress preference is clearly driven by the fact 
that this would once again give them the seats 
needed to pick the prime minister. It would appear 
that Congress is also concerned that it would do 
poorly in a new election because the public might 
blame it for failing to deliver improvements in the 
quality of life or to secure a peace agreement. The 
UML has pushed the king to form an all-party 
council of ministers, citing Article 128 of the 
constitution as giving the monarch sufficient 
authority.53 Both UML and Congress have suggested 
that if they continue to be left out of the negotiating 
process and the Chand government is not dismissed, 
they will have little choice but to resort to 
unspecified joint action. After a meeting on 12 
March 2003, they announced that either restoration 
of the old parliament or appointment of an all-party 
council of ministers would be welcome. 
Congress and UML have also been actively engaged 
with the Maoists, both to demonstrate that they are 
players and to put pressure on the palace. After a 
meeting of eleven left parties, including the Maoists, 
on 11 March 2003, Maoist leader Dinaanath Sharma 
said that the insurgents would work with the whole 
spectrum of leftist parties to reverse the king’s 
“regressive step” in dismissing Prime Minister 
Deuba on 4 October.54 However, some UML 
members are distinctly uncomfortable with the 
efforts to court the insurgents. One parliamentarian 
lamented, “It is hard to tell if the king or the Maoists 
are a greater threat to democratic values”.55 
The positions of the parties on the issues most 
important to the Maoists are highly malleable. 
Nervous that a constituent assembly would erode 
their base of power, the parties have, nevertheless, 
not completely ruled it out, although they insist that 
the normal method of amending the constitution 
through parliament would be their first choice. The 
parties welcome the concept of more clearly 
limiting the power of the monarchy and putting the 
RNA better under civilian control. However, many 
believe that the timidity of the parties in exercising 
the powers that they did possess in the 1990 
 
 
53 Article 128, clause 2: “If, for any reason the Council of 
Ministers referred to in clause (1) is dissolved, His Majesty 
shall constitute a new Council of Ministers consisting of 
representatives from the main political parties”. 
54 Kathmandu Post, 12 March 2003. 
55 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 12 March 2003. 
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constitution, including considerable say in how the 
RNA would operate, was part of the reason that the 
monarchy became increasingly assertive after the 
royal massacre. 
The parties continue to suffer from deep internal 
divisions and have been unable to forge a common 
view for dealing with either the palace or the 
Maoists. In many ways, it appears that the only 
thing that could unify them would be a continuing 
effort by the king to hold on to power. Thus far, 
however, the king’s manoeuvres have complicated 
their efforts. Feeling outflanked, they have openly 
entertained the notion that the Maoists might be a 
useful ally in street actions if the palace refuses to 
return power to elected officials. This underscores 
the danger of the current situation and the political 
brinkmanship in which all sides are engaged.  
1. What Went Wrong with Party Politics? 
The U.S. Ambassador, Michael Malinowski, 
routinely describes Nepal’s political parties in 
colourful language: “Nepal’s house is on fire and the 
politicians are arguing about who gets to sleep in the 
master bedroom”. Another diplomat in Kathmandu 
echoed his view of the party leadership, “They 
simply cannot look over the hill”. The performance 
of the parties since 1990 has left a uniformly bad 
taste in the mouths of both Nepalese and 
international observers, which helps explain the 
relative equanimity that greeted the king’s decision 
on 4 October 2002 to suspend the democratic 
process with no clear signal as to when it would be 
restored. International criticism was muted, and 
there was little in the way of popular unrest, all of 
which suggests that frustration with the current 
political party leadership is substantial. 
However, there is a deep wellspring of support 
within Nepal for the democratic process. Almost 
everyone seems to recognise that there can be no 
“turning back the clock” to a permanent system of 
absolute monarchy. Despite growing public distaste 
for the parties and the recent turmoil, support for 
multi-party democracy seems to be unshaken. While 
some suggest that the parties had begun to become 
more responsive to the public’s needs – slowly 
opening up party rules and considering more 
progressive legislation aimed at addressing some 
social ills – this process was painfully slow. 
Tragically, with the regular political process now 
derailed, opportunities for younger and more 
vigorous party leadership appear to be on hold. 
Instead, the most discredited leaders are left 
negotiating power sharing with a monarch who has 
taken power by what could fairly be considered 
extra-constitutional means. In such a situation, it is 
difficult to imagine how the broader interests of the 
public will be well represented. 
In many ways, the revolution of 1990-1991 can be 
seen as incomplete, leaving Nepal awkwardly caught 
between its traditional ways and more modern 
institutions. This often unsatisfying arrangement, 
neither past nor present, is akin to what Nepalese call 
the frustration of “chewing water”. Further, while 
the corruption and general venality of many political 
leaders has been well documented, broader systemic 
problems have also undercut the effective 
development of democracy. The failure of any party 
to develop a strong electoral mandate has certainly 
hampered general administration, and the reliance on 
coalition governments has encouraged constant 
machinations that have often brought out the worst 
in Nepal’s politicians.  
However, many party activists also argue that the 
king has maintained a disruptive role in the political 
process despite the conversion to a constitutional 
monarchy, and that the palace has often sought to 
play the parties off against each other. It is also a 
fair complaint that the monarchy has kept privileges 
that go beyond what would normally be expected in 
a constitutional monarchy, including an influential 
relationship with the RNA. Given the 
underdeveloped state of the country’s democracy, it 
is not reasonable to expect it to operate effectively 
when the spectre of palace intervention is always 
present. While members of the royal family may 
have concerns about the policy decisions of elected 
officials, a political system requires time to grow 
both more regularised and more robust. Party 
members note that the monarchy has agreed three 
times in history to be more passive and allow 
democratic rule. Each time a “passive monarchy” 
quickly became an “active monarchy”. 
In many ways, the problems of the political parties 
are simply symptomatic of the broader problems of 
class, ethnicity and caste that trouble society as a 
whole. The two largest parties, Congress and UML, 
are run by older and almost exclusively upper caste 
leaderships that remained fixated on personal 
aggrandisement and enrichment. Personality is seen 
as dominating the system. For example, Girija 
Prasad Koirala of the Congress Party has served as 
prime minister four times already during Nepal’s 
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short democracy, and he clearly thirsts to do so 
again. He appeared to actively undercut Prime 
Minister Deuba, although they share the same party. 
His name is frequently mentioned when observers 
bemoan the failure of Nepalese politicians to 
embrace a more modern or enlightened style of 
leadership. Because Congress has most frequently 
held power in Nepal’s elected governments, the 
party has seen its reputation erode most.  
The parties have large and active memberships and 
are generally constructed around a patronage system 
that has limited their ability to embrace genuine 
compromise or stake out positions that serve the 
national interest. The influence of this patronage 
system also extends well into civil society, since 
many local groups are directly allied with a specific 
party on which they rely for financial sustenance. In 
such a system the compulsion to use government 
funds to grease the wheels of party machinery has 
been impossible for many politicians to resist. The 
announcement by the Judicial Inquiry Commission 
on Property on 18 March 2003 that it had gathered 
documentation on some 2,000 officials, including 
many party officials, with respect to the amassing of 
illegal assets could prove a useful starting point for 
cleaning up the system – but only if the government 
avoids selective enforcement to further its own 
political ends.  
Interestingly, grassroots political development had 
begun to make some significant progress before the 
Maoist insurgency.56 Unfortunately, the insurgents 
have directly targeted local political party activists 
in the countryside, and the structures of local 
democracy have largely ground to a halt, leaving a 
political vacuum other than the Maoists in many 
regions. Such bottom-up political development is 
ultimately Nepal’s best hope. Giving the 
traditionally disenfranchised a growing role in the 
political process is the only viable long-term means 
by which to re-orient economic and development 
strategies toward the broader population.  
Since 1990, both the UML and Congress have 
staked out positions that are left of centre. Nepal has 
no major political force representing the right of the 
political spectrum, although the RPP has played that 
role to a minor degree. However, it should also be 
noted that the left has been largely stripped of 
ideological content, though party policies are 
 
 
56 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 13 January 2003. 
generally geared to providing a general social 
welfare state.57  
The most pressing needs for the parties are to reach 
a position with regard to negotiations with the king 
on an interim government and to stake out a clear 
position on dealing with the Maoists. The issues are 
closely linked, and the major parties appear quite 
willing to flirt with the Maoists as a means to put 
pressure on the palace to return the levers of state to 
civilian control. While it is understandable that the 
parties may feel compelled to adopt fairly desperate 
measures given their marginalisation, a poorly 
thought out alliance with the Maoists could make a 
lasting solution to the conflict more difficult. 
C. THE KING 
The monarchy has long been revered in Nepal. Yet, 
the institution has had a very difficult time adjusting 
to a modern role and has been reluctant to stay on 
the political sidelines. By taking control of the state 
after 4 October 2002, the king has dramatically 
raised the political stakes. It is a harsh commentary 
on the frequent failures of the political parties that so 
few Nepalese directly protested the king’s actions.58 
While many see the palace moves as justified by the 
peace initiative, such measures also carry with them 
fundamental risks both to the country’s democratic 
aspirations and to the institution of the monarchy 
itself. This led one European diplomat to argue to 
ICG, “The king has made a dramatic mistake, and 
the monarchy is more clearly in jeopardy than ever 
before.” Indeed, many observers feel that the king 
has painted himself into a difficult corner. Now seen 
as responsible for overseeing day-to-day 
administration (despite Prime Minister Chand’s 
formal position as head of government), the king 
will be held directly accountable for policy. 
 
 
57 One political analyst said of potential rule by either the 
UML or the Maoists, “It would be a communist government 
only in name”. ICG interview, Kathmandu, 26 February 
2003. 
58 As noted earlier, the king already enjoys exceptional 
powers under the existing constitution. For example, article 
122 notes, “His majesty shall have the power to grant 
pardons and to suspend, commute or remit any sentence 
passed by any court, special court, military court or by any 
other judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative authority or 
institution”. These powers have made it difficult for the 
courts to serve as an effective brake on steps by the 
monarchy that might normally be seen as unconstitutional.  
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In the immediate term, achieving the ceasefire and 
bringing an end to the violence have consolidated 
his position, and he has every reason to believe that 
he is acting from strength. The parties remain weak 
and divided, the RNA is firmly loyal, and his public 
standing has improved demonstrably since the 
fallout from the royal massacre. The Maoists appear 
eager for talks, the public outcry over suspension of 
democracy has been limited, and the international 
community continues to offer tacit support. 
Many commentators appear willing to give the king 
the benefit of the doubt, sensing that he is not 
absolutist. While most of these observers also feel 
that the king is shrewd and much more politically 
engaged than his late brother, a sense of his 
difficulties is difficult to ignore. One local analyst 
said, “The king is not foolish; he knows that an 
absolute monarchy is not possible in this day and 
age”. However, this same analyst acknowledged that 
patience has not always been the king’s strong suit 
and added, “He likes to be in the centre of things”.59 
While most Western officials feel the king will 
relinquish power (although acknowledging his keen 
interest in shaping the policy agenda, a role not 
usually reserved for a constitutional monarch), 
suspicions run deeper among party leaders and 
activists. Most of them remember the partyless 
system all too well, and some were jailed during the 
fight to establish a democracy before 1990-1991. A 
local journalist observed to ICG, “The king is a very 
ambitious man”, something of a mixed blessing in 
the current environment.  
The king has regained a measure of good will since 
his turbulent rise to power after the palace massacre, 
and he is widely seen as working hard in what he 
views as the public interest. However, the monarchy 
is no longer viewed as operating well above the 
fray, and criticism in the press – long unknown – 
has become common. Even many supporters of a 
constitutional monarchy feel the king over-stepped 
his bounds on 4 October 2002. In addition, there is 
deep chill in public attitudes toward Crown Prince 
Paras, to the point where some openly speculate that 
the current king will be Nepal’s last. This also in 
part reflects lingering suspicions regarding the 
palace massacre. 
While the king is indeed in a strong position, he 
remains vulnerable. Despite their lip service, there is 
 
 
59 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 14 March 2003. 
a great deal of support among both the Maoists and 
mainstream political activists for establishing a 
republic and doing away with the monarchy. While 
the Maoists and political parties have been unable to 
strike an effective alliance to date, they could form a 
powerful united front, and the king would have a 
difficult time justifying military action solely to 
protect the institution of the monarchy. Further, as 
long as proposed constitutional revisions remain 
central to the peace process – either through a 
constituent assembly or constitutional amendments 
– there will be serious discussions about limiting the 
palace’s influence over the RNA, its ability to 
influence the political process, and the general 
immunity enjoyed by the extended royal family.  
It would not be unreasonable for the Maoists or the 
parties to call for a full analysis of the royal family’s 
holdings, as the Judicial Inquiry Commission on 
Property has done for other public officials. While 
the king has steadfastly maintained that his sole 
interest is advancing the interests of the people, he 
emerged as one of Nepal’s most successful 
businessmen during his brother’s reign, and the 
monarchy must share blame for the corruption and 
mismanagement that has plagued the country. 
There are discouraging signs that officials affiliated 
with the current royalist government have failed to 
understand the seriousness of suspending a 
democratic system, no matter how badly flawed. 
One senior government official insisted to ICG, 
“The parties need a mandate from the people in the 
form of a new election, unlike the monarchy that 
enjoys the traditional mandate of the people”.60 
However, this same official made clear that no 
elections were imagined in the near future – leaving 
the parties in an untenable catch-22 situation.  
The government also uses somewhat circular logic 
in defending the decision to suspend the democratic 
process. As mentioned, supporters cite the king’s 
emergency powers as justification for his removing 
Prime Minister Deuba but they argue that he lacks 
constitutional authority to put a new all-party 
government in place or restore parliament. Yet, if 
the king enjoys such plenipotentiary powers as to 
enable him to remove a sitting prime minister and 
indefinitely postpone elections, he must surely also 
have the power to appoint an all-party government 
or arrive at some reasonable compromise that would 
 
 
60 ICG interview, 12 March 2003. 
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begin to inject democratic considerations into the 
daily operations of the state. 
In resolving the internal contradictions between his 
desire for control and a commitment to multi-party 
democracy, the king appears, at least at this juncture, 
to prefer some form of highly “guided” democracy. 
There is also much speculation that the king is again 
in favour in New Delhi, and that he may feel able 
to take the steps he has over the last six months 
because of this support, driven at least in part by 
India’s frustration with Nepalese elected officials. 
A “go slow” approach to the negotiations appears to 
be central to the king’s strategy. Maoist negotiators 
have complained that reaching even simple 
agreements takes a great deal of time because the 
government representative, Minister Pun, runs 
almost all decisions by the king himself – despite 
the hollow insistence by the palace that Prime 
Minister Chand makes decisions. The palace likely 
reasons that long negotiations will bring a series of 
advantages: the Maoists will be less likely and able 
to return to arms; the peace will have longer to take 
hold; the main political parties will become more 
irrelevant; and the king will be able to improve his 
public standing steadily.  
The palace will likely remain cautious on any 
proposal for a constituent assembly and attach 
conditions that any such arrangement would have to 
come with an advance guarantee to preserve a 
constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy. 
However, it has been suggested that given its control 
of the RNA and public standing at the moment, the 
king might even be comfortable with a referendum 
on the monarchy, although this would obviously be a 
risky roll of the dice. The palace and government 
would also like to begin any elections on a local 
basis, perhaps district-by-district arguing security 
concerns, as a means to begin to rebuild the political 
system from the bottom-up. This would also be 
consistent with a general “go-slow” approach. 
Ultimately, the king must reach some sort of 
accommodation to bring the parties into the peace 
process and eventually give them a role in an interim 
government. It must be imagined that he seeks to 
reach such an agreement in a manner that will both 
save face and maintain the role of the constitutional 
monarchy, while avoiding the sort of party deadlock 
and general failure that led him to his 4 October 
decision in the first place. The role of the monarchy 
will have to be central to any discussion of an 
interim government, constitutional revision or 
meaningful dialogue with the Maoists. The legal 
ambiguities that continue to surround the role of the 
monarch are ultimately incompatible with the rule of 
law and systemised decision-making that are 
fundamental to a healthy democracy. Like his 
brother, the current king may well find that the 
greatest contribution he can make to the public good 
is to remain on the sidelines once peace is secured. 
D. THE RNA AND THE POLICE 
The RNA has long been one of the best-respected 
institutions in Nepal. However, its prestige has 
been sorely tested. Despite its popular acclaim, the 
RNA had seen very limited action before the 
Maoist insurgency, and its duties were largely 
limited to ceremonial functions and international 
peacekeeping. The current conflict has harshly 
exposed its limits, particularly in counter insurgency.  
Ironically, Minister Pun, a former army helicopter 
pilot and now the government’s chief negotiator, 
has helped the RNA take a lead in the peace 
process. It is crucial for keeping the peace, and 
there are competing theories as to how vested it is 
in the current process. In all likelihood, the RNA is 
not of one mind about the negotiations. There 
certainly are divisions on matters ranging from 
general reform, to its close links to the monarchy, 
to the wisdom of seeking compromise with the 
Maoists at a time when some commanders felt they 
were making significant gains in the field. One 
long-time Nepal analyst commented, “There is a 
strong hardline lobby in the RNA that sees the 
talks as a bit of a surrender”.61  
Some within the RNA are willing to press what they 
feel will be a clear military advantage once they can 
both expand their ranks to some 70,000 and augment 
their capabilities with new Western arms and 
training. The government recently made a 
commercial purchase of 5,000 M-16s from the 
Unites States, and has also purchased 5,500 machine 
guns from a Belgian manufacturer. The sale sparked 
a minor political controversy in that country about 
the legitimacy of arms sales to a government with a 
spotty human rights record. It has even been 
suggested that some members of the military feel 
that a continued Maoist threat gives them an ideal 
opportunity to modernise with Western help. Others, 
particularly younger officers, are seen as far more 
 
 
61 ICG interview, 14 March 2003. 
Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic Pause? 
ICG Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003 Page 21 
 
 
 
reform minded, openly questioning whether the 
close alliance with the palace is appropriate 
institutional behaviour for a modern fighting force.  
The conflict has exposed many of the RNA’s 
shortcomings. It needs to improve its basic 
operational performance across a range of areas 
including defence of installations, intelligence, long-
range reconnaissance and the entire scheme of 
conducting counter insurgency operations without 
alienating the general population or perpetrating 
egregious human rights abuses. As an institution, 
the RNA needs to understand that its behaviour in 
waging the war put international support for Nepal 
in direct jeopardy, and that improved operational 
approaches would not only be more acceptable, but 
also more effective.  
With 75 district headquarters potentially to defend 
across some of the world’s most challenging 
terrain with only about 50,000 troops, government 
forces were simply overstretched. The RNA has 
often done a poor job defending army and police 
installations, and the Maoists have repeatedly 
mounted successful infiltrations that should have 
been detected. Outdated equipment, training 
methods and operational planning made the RNA’s 
early boasts that it could eradicate the Maoists 
within days sound painfully hollow. 
Most troubling was the actual conduct of the anti-
insurgency campaign, which created as many 
problems as it solved. The RNA and the police 
proved all too willing to use indiscriminate force 
after the collapse of the 2001 peace talks, and both 
local and international human rights organisations 
have drawn up long lists of human rights abuses. 
Extra judicial killings quickly rose, and scores of 
disappearances could be traced directly back to the 
government. Few prisoners were taken, fuelling 
further suspicions of abuses. A senior officer told 
Amnesty International that prisoners were often 
shot because of the difficulties of moving them 
through mountainous terrain and the shortage of 
prison space. The government objected strongly to 
Amnesty reporting as one-sided.62 
While government officials and their supporters 
were quick to point out the abuses of the Maoists 
and stress that the military had little choice but to 
fight a dirty war, it is clear that the government 
should be held to a higher standard of international 
 
 
62 Amnesty International, “Nepal: A Deepening Human 
Rights Crisis”, London, December 2002. 
conduct than an insurgency movement whose 
entire pattern of organisation is extra-legal. The 
atmosphere of absolute impunity for military and 
police officials was fundamental in giving the 
Maoist movement considerable impetus. Most rank 
and file fighters for the Maoists have precious little 
knowledge of Maoism – they know only how they 
have been treated by the state.  
One local human rights activist argued to ICG 
shortly before the ceasefire, “Torture is rampant”.63 
In most cases the RNA was seen as less accountable 
than the police, who generally cohabit with the 
people in whose area they patrol. Because the RNA 
often entered an area then quickly left, it felt little 
pressure to meet even basic standards of human 
rights. As one diplomat in Kathmandu complained, 
“This government doesn’t understand hearts and 
minds at all”.64 Relations between the police and the 
army remain strained. The police feel that the 
military offered them almost no support – often with 
deadly costs – in the early years of the war when the 
RNA wanted no part of dealing with the Maoists. 
Later the RNA was firmly in charge, and the police 
wanted to stay away from the issue. 
In reaching the code of conduct, the RNA developed 
important lines of communication and a baseline for 
wary trust with the Maoists. As negotiations move 
forward, the military will have an important say. The 
RNA may well remain sceptical of assimilating 
former enemy fighters, as some have suggested. 
While the proposal has appeal to the Maoists who 
want jobs for their people, Nepal needs smaller and 
better trained, not larger and less well trained army 
and police. Internal security responsibility should 
eventually be returned to the police. Constitutional 
control of the RNA will be a sticking point. 
Whatever the result of negotiations, a broader effort 
on security sector reform will be vital. A full 
accounting of both government and Maoist abuses 
during the war should be part of a lasting settlement.  
 
 
63 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 13 January 2003. 
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
Key international players – particularly the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the European Union 
and India – have very different approaches to 
Nepal’s crisis. The government remains quite 
sensitive to outside pressure given its economic 
isolation and aid dependence, which makes the 
failure of the broader international community to 
reach consensus on some core issues all the more 
frustrating. The peace process thus far appears to 
be almost entirely home grown. Many Nepalese 
are proud that they have been able to secure a 
ceasefire without international mediation. However, 
the international community can play a deeply 
influential and positive role if it can develop a 
clear policy concept. For example, it could likely 
observe and verify the ceasefire and help ensure 
that any election is free and fair. Nepal will also 
likely call for significant international aid to 
facilitate demobilisation and reconstruction efforts 
if negotiations are successful.  
A. THE UNITED STATES 
The U.S. has largely viewed the conflict in the 
context of its global battle against terrorism and 
strongly sided with the government. It provides 
just over U.S.$17 million in military assistance 
from anti-terrorism, Foreign Military Financing 
and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) funds.  
Colin Powell, the first secretary of state to visit 
Nepal, told reporters in Kathmandu in January 2002, 
“You have a Maoist insurgency that's trying to 
overthrow the government and this really is the kind 
of thing that we are fighting against throughout the 
world”. Ambassador Malinowski was more specific 
a month later:  
Nepal is currently plagued with a terrorism 
that is shaking its very foundation as a nation. 
These terrorists, under the guise of Maoism or 
the so called ‘people's war', are fundamentally 
the same as terrorists elsewhere.65  
 
 
65 Gary Leupp, “Imagining the Global Consequences of a 
Maoist Victory in Nepal”, Counterpunch, Petrolia, California, 
21 October 2002. 
In a statement after the ceasefire that drew 
considerable ire in the Nepalese press, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Donald Camp suggested 
that U.S. policy was closely coordinated with New 
Delhi and that recent Maoist statements had 
defended the Khmer Rouge. His comment that Nepal 
was a “budding democracy” seemed out of touch.  
After comments by Baburam Bhattari that the 
Maoists were eager to reach out to diplomatic 
missions, Malinowski reacted coolly, “Given their 
violent history of destroying infrastructure projects, 
does anyone take the Maoists seriously”?66 Without 
precluding some form of diplomatic engagement, 
most major European missions also appeared to 
reject a meeting at ambassadorial level.  
The Maoists claimed responsibility for shooting two 
Nepalese guards who worked for the U.S. Embassy, 
and they have also directly targeted U.S. Agency for 
International Development projects in the field.67 
Their rhetoric has always had a strong anti-U.S. 
flavour, and Washington has a good deal of material 
to work with in making the case that they are 
terrorists, including selective political killings, 
attacks on teachers and other local officials, bomb 
attacks and the kidnapping of boys and young men 
from rural families to bolster their fighting strength. 
U.S. officials also express concern that Nepal has 
the potential to become a failed and lawless state 
that might provide safe haven for a variety of 
unsavoury international figures – much as 
Afghanistan did under Taliban rule. Mounting U.S. 
pressure and military assistance was clearly a factor 
in pushing the Maoists toward the peace table. 
That said, there is understandable concern that the 
focus on terrorism fundamentally misreads the 
situation on the ground, and the U.S. is too willing 
to look past government abuses that have both 
helped create and perpetuate the conflict and the 
dangers posed by the suspension of the democratic 
system. U.S. criticism of both RNA human rights 
abuses and the king’s suspension of democracy 
have been sufficiently muted as to send the message 
that they are actually condoned. Further, in an 
environment where the RNA appears unwilling to 
institute even basic mechanisms of accountability 
within its ranks, it is certainly fair to question the 
wisdom of pouring in more weapons.  
 
 
66 The Himalayan Times, 3 April 2003. 
67 ICG interviews, Kathmandu, January, February-March 
2003. 
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While U.S. officials remain outwardly supportive of 
the ceasefire and peace talks, they are deeply 
sceptical of negotiations with the Maoists. The U.S. 
has not officially designated the Maoists as a 
terrorist group and is unlikely to do so as long as the 
talks go on. However, if the Maoists break them off, 
Washington would likely act, which in turn would 
make a later effort to bring the Maoists into the 
political system extremely difficult. 
B. EUROPE 
Before the ceasefire, concerns about the human 
rights situation loomed much larger in European 
quarters. The European Union in particular was 
increasingly vocal.68 In December 2002, the EU 
presidency declared: 
While the European Union acknowledges the 
Government of Nepal's right to protect its 
citizens and institutions within the framework 
of the Constitution, it notes with deep concern 
the evidence of human rights violations 
committed by the Security Forces with 
impunity.69  
If fighting were to resume and the RNA failed to 
improve its conduct, the EU would likely take the 
lead in curtailing assistance – and certainly the 
supply of arms – to Kathmandu. 
The UK, one of the most influential Western 
governments in Nepal, has come down somewhere 
between the U.S. and the EU. It is willing to assist 
in increasing the operational effectiveness of the 
RNA in conducting counter-insurgency operations, 
and two British-purchased, Russian-made MI-17 
helicopters bought from Belarus were delivered to 
the government on 1 March 2003. Although the 
British made clear that the helicopters were to be 
used solely for medical, logistical and humanitarian 
purposes, they would obviously free up other RNA 
helicopters for direct combat activities if fighting 
with the Maoists were to resume. 
The British have also placed a great deal of 
emphasis on dealing with the root causes of the 
 
 
68 The British have a unique position due to their historical 
links to Nepal, including the service of large numbers of 
Nepalese as Gurkhas in the British military. 
69 Declaration by the European Union Presidency on behalf 
of the European Union on the Human Rights Situation in 
Nepal, 18 December 2002. 
conflict, and unlike the U.S., have demonstrated a 
willingness to carry out development programs in 
areas that are under Maoist control. This has meant 
that British officials have had to engage Maoists in a 
dialogue, and this has likely resulted in a greater 
understanding and relationship on both sides.70 
British officials have been far keener to see talks 
move forward, and in February 2003 London 
appointed Sir Jeffrey James, the former British High 
Commissioner in Kenya, as the Special 
Representative for Nepal in an effort to more 
closely coordinate policy. In response to the 
expressed desire of Baburam Bhattari to meet with 
Western diplomatic officials, British Ambassador 
Keith Bloomfield said, “We will have to listen to 
them because the government has to work with the 
Maoists for reconstruction and rehabilitation”.71 
Sir Jeffrey pointedly noted in mid-March that the 
UK would not seek to play any role in mediating 
talks and that the RNA would have British backing 
if the talks broke down.72 However, the UK has 
already begun exploring possible ways to help 
support the possible demobilisation of Maoist 
cadres if a peace deal is reached. 
C. INDIA 
India has a unique role in Nepal. Its influence is 
almost overwhelming on issues of trade, water, 
security and immigration. There is still considerable 
anger over the Peace and Friendship Treaty signed 
in 1950, and in some respects India is disliked for 
what is seen as its hegemonic influence.73 Some 
Nepalese even joke that anti-Indian sentiment is one 
of the great forces that binds Nepal together. But the 
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“official” discussions, aid officials from those countries 
working in Maoist dominated areas have generally held 
informal talks with the Maoists to “approve” projects. 
71 The Himalayan Times, 3 April 2003. 
72 His comments came at a media roundtable in Kathmandu 
on 14 March 2003 and were widely reported in the local 
press. 
73 At first glance it is hard to see why the treaty is a source 
of such intense resentment as it pledges everlasting peace 
and friendship, lays out the basis for diplomatic relations 
and agrees on mutual economic and trade access. However 
in 1989 the India imposed a trade embargo on Nepal after 
the government in Kathmandu purchased arms from China. 
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relationship is far deeper and more complex than the 
rhetoric suggests.  
Nepal is deeply reliant on trade with India and 
remittances from families working there. If India 
were no longer to treat its border with Nepal as open, 
Nepalese suffering would likely be considerable. An 
Indian official noted to ICG that many Nepalese 
politicians insist in private that their anti-Indian 
rhetoric is “just for show” and that they fully realise 
the importance of the bilateral relationship. A 
Nepalese political analyst roughly echoed these 
sentiments: “In Nepal, you are always anti-Indian 
when you are in the opposition, and you always 
work with India when you are in power”.74  
As noted above, many observers in Kathmandu 
believe a tougher line by New Delhi helped bring the 
Maoists to negotiations. India it is said was growing 
increasingly anxious about both the decaying 
situation in Nepal and the growing strategic 
influence of Washington. It has also been suggested 
that the India has become more supportive of the 
king, feeling he can return a greater stability to the 
situation. Indian concerns may include that chaos in 
Nepal could provide an opportunity for Pakistani 
meddling. While there has been no indication of 
such a development, the absence of security in much 
of Western Nepal may well have alarmed India. 
Much of the Maoist senior leadership has used 
Northern India as a staging area and refuge, 
particularly the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. 
This triggered much speculation until recently that 
India was not acting as robustly against the Maoists 
as it could. However, Indian foreign ministry 
officials strongly argued that what little success was 
achieved against the Maoists was the result of Indian 
intelligence efforts and that Nepal’s own attempts to 
share intelligence have been woefully inadequate. 
Further, given that the Indian-Nepalese border is 
1,800-kilometres, that it is open, and that Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh are two of India’s most unruly states, 
there are clear limits to India’s capacity. 
New Delhi, like Washington, may well believe that 
talks with the Maoists will prove unproductive 
absent greater military pressure. Indian officials 
have expressed deep reservations about Maoist 
participation in any interim government and 
continue to feel that the insurgents remain 
committed to taking control of the entire state. 
 
 
74 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 26 February 2003. 
Indeed, despite the complaints before the ceasefire 
by both Nepalese and international officials that 
India was not acting strongly enough against 
Maoists operating on its territory, Indian rhetoric is 
staunchly anti-Maoist.  
It is likely that India hedges its bets in Nepal, 
playing something of a parallel game and remaining 
closely engaged with the monarchy, the Maoists and 
the political parties. A former Nepalese diplomat 
argued to ICG, “India is not entirely happy, and they 
conveyed directly to the king that they do not want 
to see the parties completely marginalised”.75 It was 
also suggested that India may not have been taken 
into the king’s confidence when back channel talks 
were ongoing with the Maoists during December 
and January. That India would expect to be fully 
informed of such dealings says a great deal about its 
level of influence in Nepal. 
A visit by the king to India in mid-March 2003, 
while billed largely as a religious pilgrimage, was 
also seen as an effort to coordinate policy. Visits 
by Nepalese leaders generally prompt widespread 
anxiety in Kathmandu that India will use them to 
push its policy agenda more ambitiously.  
India will likely remain sceptical about a potential 
constituent assembly. It will also be eager to 
ensure that whatever arrangement is negotiated is 
responsive to its core security and economic 
concerns. It will be interesting to see whether the 
Maoists substantially alter their anti-Indian rhetoric 
as part of an effort to ensure themselves a soft 
landing in the political mainstream. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Nepal has an important opportunity to pull itself out 
of conflict before more lives are needlessly lost, 
social divisions are made more raw and its fragile 
economy is torn to tatters. The desire for peace is 
widespread, and there is little thirst for revenge 
killings. The Maoists have taken a serious first step, 
and both they and the RNA are to be commended 
for their relative restraint since the ceasefire was 
announced. All sides have demonstrated a measure 
of patience in agreeing that substantive talks will 
take time to conclude. 
But there is also an uneasy feel to the current calm, 
and a general sense that the main actors are still 
willing to place self-interest ahead of national 
interest. Many Nepalese fear that arrogance and 
stubbornness could push them to overreach where 
genuine compromise is needed. It remains unclear 
that a peace process largely directed by, and for, the 
elite leaders of each of these factions will result in 
political arrangements that credibly begin to address 
the grave problems of underdevelopment. The only 
true consensus beyond a general hope for peace is 
that if violence resumes it will be even more 
intensive and devastating than previously. 
A number of forces could unravel the ceasefire. 
The government’s determination to keep the talks 
between the RNA and the Maoists is sensible from 
a practical operational standpoint but may well 
persuade others that they would be better served by 
undermining the negotiations lest their interests be 
excluded in any final settlement.  
It will remain tempting for the international 
community to overlook the increasingly 
undemocratic nature of the government in hopes 
that a strong king is best positioned to secure a 
lasting peace. Certainly, the frustration with the 
political parties is understandable. Yet, the Maoists 
are not the only problem. Many of Nepal’s most 
serious challenges can be traced back to institutional 
failures, mainly pre-dating the democratic era. This 
is not to excuse the parties’ corrupt and venal 
practices but to suggest that there is a rare 
opportunity to put the fundamental questions of 
governance on the table. Issues such as corruption, 
security sector reform, the constitution, political 
decentralisation, representation of women and 
ethnic minorities, the king’s role and ways to ensure 
that foreign aid reaches intended recipients should 
all be part of a much needed discussion about how 
the country can both achieve and maintain peace. 
Again, this reinforces the notion that at some point 
talks will have to expand beyond a give and take 
between the Maoists and the royal palace. While 
both groups would like to claim they enjoy a broad 
mandate, the common people are more than capable 
of expressing their will directly through an election, 
referendum or the input of social groups. Nepal’s 
population is increasingly dominated by the young, 
and new voices and new leadership are vital to 
shaping the country’s future. The events of 1990 did 
not allow for the broader issues facing the country 
to be put to the people. It would be a shame if a rare 
second such opportunity were lost. 
Nepal will need an agreement regarding an interim 
government – with or without the Maoists. The 
continuing failure of the parties and the monarchy to 
reach a fundamental accord has only exacerbated 
the potential for a more widespread conflict, and 
both must understand that their opportunity – and 
the reservoir of international goodwill – will 
steadily evaporate. Efforts to engage the broad 
spectrum of civil society more fully in determining 
the country’s future will also be vital.  
All parties to the conflict need to take a long hard 
look at the situation and realise that the cost of 
confrontation will likely outweigh any short-term 
tactical gain they might hope to exploit. At the 
least, given the country’s precarious economic 
state, intensified warfare could well lead to a 
protracted and complex emergency that would sap 
its potential for years to come. 
Kathmandu/ Brussels, 10 April 2003 
 
Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic Pause? 
ICG Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003 Page 26 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
MAP OF NEPAL 
 
 
 
Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin 
Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic Pause? 
ICG Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003 Page 27 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 
 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an 
independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, 
with over 90 staff members on five continents, 
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Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo, Sierra Leone and 
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